This study examines the relationship between sponsor ownership and firm performance proxied by firm value, operating cash flow, and dividend policy with Asian real estate investment trusts (REITs) in Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore for the period from 2002 to 2012, focusing on both the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. Our study sheds new light on effective corporate governance for Asian REITs that are prone to agency problems.
Introduction
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) in Asian countries are structured as "captive REITs," managed by external asset management companies that are wholly or partially owned by the sponsors (see Figure 1 for details). Most sponsors of Asian REITs are banks or developers holding large portfolios of illiquid investment-grade real estate. Such sponsors use the REIT structure to offload properties during initial public offerings (IPOs). Therefore, the sponsor can significantly influence Asian REITs' investment policies and operations because the sponsor has control over the asset managers and the board of trustees; this creates conflicts of interest between the sponsor/manager and the shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1988) .
The conflicts of interest result in agency problems, as evidenced by some of related party property transactions 1 (RPTs) and financing activities between sponsors and their REITs (Hsieh and Sirmans, 1991; Ooi, Ong, and Neo, 2011) . Sponsors, who own and control REIT advisors, act as both sellers and buyers in these transactions, raising concerns over the price paid for and the quality 2 of such transactions (CFA, 2011; RiskMetrics, 2009 ). As summarized in Appendix A, REITs pay more for properties acquired from their sponsors than they would pay for properties acquired from independent third parties (Fortune REIT; FC Residential Investment Corporation; Keppel REIT) and REITs involve financing activities favorable to sponsors (MacArthurCook REIT; Mori Hills REIT). In fact, studies that have focused on 3 externally managed US REITs (Hsieh and Sirmans, 1991; Cannon and Vogt, 1995; Capozza and Seguin, 2000) suggest that sponsors benefit from these related party transactions and REITs are merely divestment vehicles for illiquid investment-grade real estate, allowing sponsors to recycle capital efficiently. Figure 2 shows that sponsors gradually offload their shareholdings as their REITs get older.
Being inherently vulnerable to agency problems largely due to the unique external management style, Asian REITs must seek ways to mitigate agency problems to increase firm value. One notable solution is through the management of ownership structure, especially equity ownership by sponsors (sponsor ownership). Jensen and Mackling's (1976) model predicts that large managerial shareholdings result in higher firm value because it allows managers' interests and incentives to be closely aligned with those of outside shareholders (incentive alignment effect). Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Stulz (1988) show that the firm's value increases only until a certain point, after which managers become entrenched and pursue private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders (entrenchment effect).
The purpose of this study is to examine whether and how sponsor ownership interacts with agency problems prevalent in Asian REITs and affects firm performance. Specifically, we examine the effects of sponsor ownership on REIT firm value (Tobin's Q), operating performance (FFO/Total Assets), and dividend policy (Dividend Yield and Dividend Payout), while considering both the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. We further hypothesize that the effect of sponsor ownership on performance measures can be influenced by sponsor type (banks and developers). Developer sponsors, 3 which tend to conduct more frequent related party property transactions with their REITs (Wong et al., 2013) , have more opportunities to consume perquisites or enhance their REITs' growth opportunities with property pipeline support. Similarly, while the strong banking relationships with bank sponsors can ensure access to bank debt and enhance REITs' growth opportunities, the lack of real estate expertise of bank sponsors (property pipeline support) could negatively affect operating performance. We also examine whether governance mechanism affects agency problems of Asian REITs or firm performance because Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) , Han (2006), and Hartzell et al. (2006) provide some evidence of effects of governance mechanism on agency issues among US REITs.
While the literature on corporate governance in Asian REITs remains fairly thin, the unique environment of Asian REIT markets where all REITs are externally managed warrants understanding the role of sponsor ownership in relation to prevailing agency issues. This study contributes to the existing literature by deepening an understanding of effective corporate governance for Asian REITs.
We find a significant positive effect of sponsor ownership on firm value and operating cash flows, which diminishes as sponsor ownership further increases. This finding is consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis, whereby larger sponsor shareholdings align the interests of sponsors with those of minority shareholders and, thus, enhance REIT performance.
The non-linearity of the effect suggests the existence of the entrenchment effect. We also find a negative non-linear relationship between sponsor ownership and dividend policy, suggesting that committed sponsors are long-term investors, retaining cash for future growth opportunities instead of distributing it to enhance personal wealth. Different governance mechanisms, with the exception of institutional investors, have weak impacts on REIT performance. The results further show that incentive alignment effects are driven by developer sponsors. Specifically, higher firm valuation for developer-sponsored REITs can stem from either enhanced growth opportunities from lower dividend payments or improved operating cash flows caused by the increasing sponsor shareholdings. Major results remain robust even after controlling for endogeneity between sponsor ownership and firm value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the previous studies relevant to this study. The data and methodology we employ in this study are detailed in the subsequent section followed by discussion of descriptive statistics and regression results.
The final section concludes.
II.
Literature Review
The separation of ownership and control exacerbates agency problems (Berle and Means, 1932) as managers can act against the interests of shareholders, through either empire building (Jensen, 1986) or consumption of perquisites (Morck et al., 1988) . However, studies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1983; 1985) also show that managerial shareholdings should have no relationship with firm performance as both managerial holdings and firm performance are endogenously determined by changes in the firm's contracting environment. Thus, the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance remains an empirical puzzle that stimulated the examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value with REITs that are more prone to agency issues. Agency issues with REITs arise from unique regulations (Friday et al., 1999; Han, 2006) or the weak disciplining mechanisms relative to general corporations (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003; Hartzell et al., 2006) .
The REIT literature on the topic has provided mixed results using different measures of firm performance, including firm value (Friday et al., 1999; Capozza and Seguin, 2003; Han, 2006 , Hartzell et al., 2006 , operating performance (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003; Capozza and Seguin, 2003) , and risk-taking behavior (Dolde and Knopf, 2010) . While some studies report a linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, providing evidence for the incentive alignment effect (Cappoza and Seguin, 2003; Hartzell et al., 2006) , others document a diminishing effect of managerial ownership on firm performance, suggesting the existence of the entrenchment effect (Friday et al., 1999; Han, 2006) . Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) find that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance with REITs becomes insignificant after controlling for alternative governance mechanisms and endogeneity between managerial ownership and firm performance. Further investigations reveal that the incentive alignment effect is evident because increased managerial ownership results in improved cash flow and lower managerial expense (Cappoza and Seguin, 2003) .
However, when managerial ownership is too high, REIT managers tend to undertake less risk (Capozza and Seguin, 2003; Dolde and Knopf, 2010) and invest in inferior opportunities (Hartzell et al., 2006) , which provides evidence for the entrenchment effect with REITs.
Our choice of dividend policy as one of firm performance measures is motivated by findings in the REIT literature. For example, Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993) 
Sponsor Ownership, Firm Value, and Operating Performance
Our measure for REIT firm value is Tobin's Q, defined as the sum of market value of equity, the market value of preferred stock, and book value of long-and short-term debt divided by the book value of total assets (Perfect and Wiles, 1994). Tobin's Q has been widely used as a measure of firm value; 7 it is a valid measure of firm value especially for Asian REITs because properties held by REITs are appraised and their book values are updated semi-annually. We use funds from operations scaled by total assets (FFO/TotalAsset) as our measure of operating performance. This measure is superior to other performance measures (Vincent, 1999; Downs and Guner, 2006) for REITs.
Our key independent variable is sponsor ownership (SPOWN), which is defined as the total shareholdings held by the sponsor firm and all its related companies divided by the number of shares outstanding of each REIT. To capture the non-linear relationship between sponsor holdings and firm value, we specify quadratic specification by including a squared term for sponsor ownership variable (SPOWNsq).
We further specify alternative governance mechanisms by six variables. Given that firm value is higher in firms with stronger boards (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003) , stronger monitoring from institutional investors (Pound, 1988; Han, 2006) , and external block holders (Kaplan and Minton, 1994), we use board size (BODSize), board independence (OUTBOD), institutional ownership (INSTIOWN), and outside block ownership (BLOCKOWN).
Leverage (Leverage) is included as a control variable as debt holders are superior monitors that can alleviate agency problems due to their ability to collect information and screen a firm during lending activities (Diamond, 1984) . Future growth opportunities of a REIT are likely to be reflected in Tobin's Q. Therefore, we include firm size (Size) as a control as larger REITs find it increasingly difficult to make yield accretive acquisitions (Ooi et al., 2011) .
Asset growth (Assetgrowth) is included to control for growth opportunities (Han, 2006) . While we measure operating cash flows using FFO/TotalAsset, we account for the profitability of the REIT using the same variable for firm value specification because more profitable REITs are likely to be more highly valued by the market. Furthermore, we control for stock price volatility (Sigma) as it may induce concentrated managerial shareholdings due to greater scope of moral hazard (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) .
Sponsor Ownership and Dividend Policy
Following Ghosh and Sirmans (2006), we measure the distribution of dividends using dividend yield (DIVYIELD), which is computed as the dividend per share divided by the price per share, and dividend payout (DIVPAY), which is computed as the total common dividends divided by net income. Our key independent variable is again sponsor ownership (SPOWN). A squared term for the sponsor ownership variable (SPOWNsq) is also included.
To capture possible dividend smoothing from REIT managers, we include FFO (t-1)
and changeFFO, defined as lagged funds from operations and change in funds from operations from the previous period, respectively. Following Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993) and Ghosh and Sirmans (2006), we further control for performance ratios such as return on assets (ROA)
and Tobin's Q as proxies for investment opportunities. If shareholders use past performance as an indication of future growth prospects, we expect REITs with superior past performance to pay out lower amounts of dividends.
We run pooled OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors for the main analyses where different firm performance measures become dependent variables and the percentages of shares owned by sponsors (SPOWN) and its squared term (SPOWNsq) are main independent variables along with relevant control variables. We also include sector dummies (Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office, and Diversified), time dummies (i.e. year fixed effect), and country dummies (Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore). 8
The descriptions of all the variables in our models are detailed in Table 1 . reported to be larger (8.08) and more independent (65.5%) in US REITs than the comparatively smaller (5.39) and less independent boards in Asian REITs (58%). The smaller board size for Asian REITs is largely driven by Japanese REITs, which on average have fewer than four board members. Institutional monitoring is also stronger in US REITs with larger institutional shareholdings (45.0%) than Asian REITs (28.0%). The lack of ownership restrictions could explain the larger shareholdings held by external block shareholders in Asian REITs (10.0%) than US REITs (5.3%).
IV. Results

Descriptive Statistics
As shown in Appendix B, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all major independent variables are smaller than 3 with the mean VIF of 1.46, suggesting that there is not any serious multi-collinearity issue among the variables. With the combined sample, consistent with the findings of Han (2006), we report a strongly significant non-linear relationship 14 between sponsor shareholdings and REIT firm value. Other things being equal, Tobin's Q increases by around 0.01 with every 1% increase in sponsor holdings (SPOWN), while this rate appears to decrease as sponsor shareholdings increase, as evident with the significant negative effect of the squared term of sponsor ownership variable (SPOWNsq). 15 The results suggest that large sponsor ownership induces sponsors to pursue wealth maximizing policies that increase REIT firm value (incentive alignment effect), but such an effect diminishes as sponsor ownership becomes even larger (entrenchment effect).
Tobin's Q and Sponsor Ownership
Another notable finding is that higher firm value for REITs is associated with larger institutional shareholdings (INSTIOWN) similar to the findings reported in Pound (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) . The results imply that the involvement of institutional investors mitigates agency issues for Asian REITs, resulting in higher firm value.
We also find that older REITs (REITAge) are more highly valued by the market. This result suggests that more experienced asset managers may be more capable of creating wealth 13 We avoid using firm fixed effects because sponsor shareholdings change very slowly over time, meaning that any relationship between firm value and ownership is likely to be captured cross-sectionally. As a result, employing the firm fixed effect, which removes cross-sectional variation across data, is likely to obscure the relationship between sponsor shareholdings and firm value (Zhou, 2001) .
14 Concerned that this positive relationship could be driven by the sample of Malaysian REITs with concentrated shareholdings, we remove them from our analysis as a robustness check and find that our results remain the same.
for their shareholders. Our findings also indicate that larger REITs and REITs with higher stock volatility may have lesser future growth opportunities, as evident with the significant negative coefficient of Size and Sigma.
We further stratify our sample based on the notion that the capacity to create or destroy shareholder wealth may differ across sponsor types. Our findings reveal that incentive alignment effect is stronger among developer-sponsored REITs than among bank-sponsored 
Dividend Policy and Sponsor Ownership
One way that sponsors can extract wealth from their REITs is through dividend distribution.
Sponsors can choose to enhance personal wealth instead of retaining cash for future growth opportunities by distributing larger dividends. Therefore, in the spirit of Ghosh and Sirmans (2006), we examine the relationship between sponsor shareholdings and dividend distribution (dividend yield and dividend payout). Result are reported in Table 5 .
Similar to the findings of Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) for a sample of US REITs, we document a negative non-linear relationship between sponsor shareholdings and dividend yield 16 with the combined sample that appears to diminish as sponsor shareholdings increase.
Other things being equal, dividend yield will fall by 0.1% with every 1% increase in sponsor
shareholdings. It appears that sponsors, instead of paying out more dividends to increase their personal wealth, exert a stronger effort to retain cash for future growth opportunities as their shareholdings increase. 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation
As mentioned, one major concern when examining ownership and performance is that the two can be endogenously determined. Many studies have addressed this econometric problem using the simultaneous equation approach 18 but, as highlighted by Himmelberg et al. (1999) , it is often difficult to identify good instruments for ownership. In fact, widely used instruments like firm size (Size and Sizesq) and stock price volatility (Sigma) appear to be highly correlated with firm value, operating cash flows, and dividend distribution under a multivariate framework, which leads to questions about their validity as instruments (see results in Tables 3-5 ).
Therefore, we specify a vector of sponsor characteristics as instruments for sponsor shareholdings. Certain sponsors like developer sponsors (Wong et al., 2013) and governmentlinked sponsors (Mak et al., 2001 ) may subject their REITs to severe moral hazard issues and are required to hold more shareholdings to mitigate agency concerns. Based on this notion, we believe that sponsor types (Bank_SP, Dev_SP, GLC_SP) are valid instruments for sponsor shareholdings. We further hypothesize that the reputation of the sponsor can influence its capacity to retain its REIT shareholdings and we proxy for reputation using SPList, a binary variable that indicates whether the sponsor is listed, and SPAge, a continuous variable denoting the age of sponsor. We also account for the number of REITs spun off by sponsors (LN_spinoffs) as sponsors that are likely to influence sponsor shareholdings (see Table 1 for definition).
Estimations between sponsor shareholdings and various performance metrics (firm value, operating cash flows, and dividend policy) using two-staged least squares are reported in Table   6 .
Most of our findings remain robust after controlling for endogeneity between sponsor shareholdings and performance. A robust positive (negative) nonlinear relation is detected between sponsor shareholdings and firm value (dividend yield), respectively. The relationship between sponsor shareholdings and operating performance, however, becomes insignificant when estimated using 2SLS. We further confirm the effectiveness of institutional investors in mitigating agency problems, reducing the need to distribute dividends, and enhancing REIT firm value. Post estimation results validate the quality of the instrument variables.
V. Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between sponsor holdings and firm value using cross- Fortune REIT proposed an acquisition of three properties from its sponsor, Cheung Kong. Fortune REIT planned to fund this acquisition by a rights issue of HKD 1.9 billion. At the point of acquisition, Cheung Kong is a significant shareholder of Fortune REIT holding almost 40% of the shares. The proposed transaction was unfavorable for Fortune REIT, as the net asset value per share would fall from $7.5 to $4.8 and the distribution yield would decrease from 9% to 7.2%. Fortune REIT was overpaying for these acquisitions as the non-prime properties were valued at overly optimistic yields.
Sponsor shareholdings and REIT Age
Figure 3: Distribution of sponsor shareholdings in Asian and US REITs
On the day of acquisition, Fortune REIT lost about 10% of its share value due to excessive dumping of shares by investors.
FC Residential Investment Corporation
Japan Financing FC Residential REIT announced that it would acquire properties from its sponsors. Ichigo group intended to finance the acquisitions via private placements. Units would be issued into a special-purpose vehicle affiliated with the sponsor at a price of 180,000 yen, which was approximately 25% below the closing traded price and a 61% discount to its book value.
Several investors requested to suspend the proposed property transaction, which was highly disadvantageous to existing shareholders. The REIT was forced to suspend this transaction.
Keppeland REIT Singapore RPTs K-REIT proposed to sell Keppel Towers and GE Towers at $573 million to its sponsor, Keppel Land, while using those proceeds to purchase 87.5% stake of Ocean Financial Center at $2.01 billion from Keppel Land. Questions were raised about the price paid by K-REIT for the acquisition of Ocean Financial Center as it was K-REIT lost approximately 10% of its share value on the day of announcing the asset swap.
34 very much overvalued as compared to recent transacted prices.
Mori Hills REIT Japan RPTs Financing
Mori Hills REIT announced that it would acquire two properties from its sponsor, Mori Hill Building Co. and sell one of the properties back to its sponsor. This acquisition would be funded by private placement in which the sponsor would receive new units at 500,000 yen. This offering price was approximately 33% lower than the IPO price and a 13% discount from book value per share. In addition, Mori Hill was overpaying for the RPT as the transaction price was much higher than the appraised value. As a result of this transaction, sponsor ownership increased from 15% to 30%.
Mori Hill REIT managed to execute the transaction without investor intervention. The management indicated that the distribution per unit would not be affected by optimistic rental projections.
Macarthurcook
REIT Singapore Financing
Macarthurcook Investment REIT (MI-REIT) faced difficulties in refinancing its expiring debts due to the subprime credit crisis in 2009. Around the same time, AIMS financial group acquired Macarthurcook Group (MI-REIT's sponsor). Cambridge Industrial Trust (CIT) proposed the acquisition of MI-REIT to bail it out from its refinancing crisis. However, AIMS Financial Group (the sponsor) was reluctant to sell to CIT and instead chose to recapitalize. New share units raised from the recapitalization would constitute 85% of the total units outstanding.
Severe dilution of the share value of existing unit holders occurred because of the reluctance of sponsors to divest the REIT. The recapitalization caused the share price to decline by more than 50%. Shareholders have no specific provisions to impose control on the severe dilution. 
Appendix B: Summary of collinearity diagnostic
